History & Society

Strategic Arms Reduction Talks

international arms control negotiations
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Also known as: START, START II
Date:
1982 - 2011
Participants:
Russia
United States

Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union (and, later, Russia) that were aimed at reducing those two countries’ arsenals of nuclear warheads and of the missiles and bombers capable of delivering such weapons. The talks, which began in 1982, spanned a period of three eventful decades that saw the collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War, and the major crises of the early 21st century.

START I

The START negotiations were successors to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks of the 1970s. In resuming strategic-arms negotiations with the Soviet Union in 1982, U.S. Pres. Ronald Reagan renamed the talks START and proposed radical reductions, rather than merely limitations, in each superpower’s existing stocks of missiles and warheads. In 1983 the Soviet Union abandoned arms control talks in protest against the deployment of intermediate-range missiles in western Europe (see Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty). In 1985 START resumed, and the talks culminated in July 1991 with a comprehensive strategic-arms-reduction agreement signed by U.S. Pres. George H.W. Bush and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. The new treaty was ratified without difficulty in the U.S. Senate, but in December 1991 the Soviet Union broke up, leaving in its wake four independent republics with strategic nuclear weapons—Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Russia. In May 1992 the Lisbon Protocol was signed, which allowed for all four to become parties to START I and for Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan either to destroy their strategic nuclear warheads or to turn them over to Russia. This made possible ratification by the new Russian Duma, although not before yet another agreement had been reached with Ukraine setting the terms for the transfer of all the nuclear warheads on its territory to Russia. All five START I parties exchanged the instruments of ratification in Budapest on Dec. 5, 1994.

The START I treaty set limits to be reached in a first phase within three years and then a second phase within five years. By the end of the second phase, in 1999, both the United States and Russia would be permitted a total of 7,950 warheads on a maximum of 1,900 delivery vehicles (missiles and bombers). This limit involved reductions from established levels of about 11,000 warheads on each side. Of the 7,950 permitted warheads, no more than 6,750 could be mounted on deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The treaty included demanding verification measures, including on-site inspection, monitors at the Russian mobile ICBM factory at Votkinsk, and access to missile telemetry, which provides details of the characteristics of missiles being tested. By early 1997 Belarus and Kazakhstan had reached zero nuclear warheads, and Ukraine destroyed its last ICBMs in 1999. The United States and Russia reached the required levels for the second phase during 1997.

A third phase was to be completed by the end of 2001, when both sides were to get down to 6,000 warheads on a maximum of 1,600 delivery vehicles, with no more than 4,900 warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs. Although there had been concerns that this goal would not be achieved because of the expense and difficulty of decommissioning weapons, both sides enacted their cuts by 2001. The START I treaty expired on Dec. 5, 2009.

During the negotiations on START I, one of the most controversial issues had been how to handle limits on nuclear-armed cruise missiles, as verification would be difficult to implement. The issue was finally handled by means of separate political declarations by which the two sides agreed to announce annually their planned cruise missile deployments, which were not to exceed 880.

START II

Even as they agreed on the outline of START I in 1990, the United States and the Soviet Union accepted that further reductions should be negotiated. However, real negotiations had to wait for the elections that established the leadership of the new Russian Federation in 1992. The START II treaty was agreed on at two summit meetings between George H.W. Bush and Russian Pres. Boris Yeltsin, the first in Washington, D.C., in June 1992 and the second in Moscow in January 1993. Under its terms, both sides would reduce their strategic warheads to 3,800–4,250 by 2000 and to 3,000–3,500 by 2003. They would also eliminate multiple independent reentry vehicles (MIRVs) on their ICBMs—in effect eliminating two of the more controversial missiles of the Cold War, the U.S. Peacekeeper missile and the Russian SS-18. Later, in order to accommodate the delays in signing and ratifying START I, the deadlines were put back to 2004 and 2007, respectively.

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START II never actually came into force. The U.S. Senate did not ratify the treaty until 1996, largely because the parallel process was moving so slowly in the Russian Duma. There the treaty became a hostage to growing Russian irritation with Western policies in the Persian Gulf and the Balkans and then to concerns over American attitudes toward the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The Russian preference would have been for far lower final levels, as Russia lacked the resources to replace many of its aging weapons systems, but achieved at a slower pace, because it also lacked the resources for speedy decommissioning. In 2000 the Duma linked the fate of START II to the ABM Treaty, and in June 2002, following the United States’ withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, the Duma repudiated START II.